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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
ARTICLE 6: RIGHTS OF AN AGGRIEVED
CREDITOR OF A BULK TRANSFEROR
Like the earlier Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Actl. and the various
bulk sales laws, Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated
to prevent the wrongs effected by certain types of commercial fraud.2 Once
it is determined that the enterprise in question is subject to Article 6,3 i.e., that
the transfer is a "bulk trarisfer,"4 and that the transfer is not excepted from
1 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws promulgated the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1918 in an attempt to make uniform the law
relating to fraudulent conveyances. The primary value of the Act lies in its provisions
establishing a definite concept of insolvency and a clear definition of persons legally
injured by a fraudulent transfer. These provisions facilitate an understanding of what
constitutes a fraudulent transfer and who has standing to challenge the fraud. In contrast
with earlier fraudulent conveyance statutes, this Act is not drafted with a presumption
of fraudulent intent as a basis for declaring a transfer void. Certain transfers are void
irrespective of intent, while others require proof of actual intent. Twenty-three states
and the Virgin Islands have adopted the Act without substantial change from the uni-
form version.
2 Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 6-101 defines the common forms of commercial
fraud which the various bulk sales laws are designed to prevent:
(a) The merchant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to a friend
for less than it is worth, pays his creditors less than he owes them, and hopes
to come back into the business through the back door some time in the future.
(h) The merchant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to any one
for any price, pockets the proceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid.
The first example is the typical fraudulent conveyance and the substantive law con-
cerning it has been codified in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See note 1
supra.
The second example represents the major bulk sales risk, and its prevention is the
central purpose of Article 6. See U.C.C. § 6-101, Comments 2, 3, 4. Unless otherwise in-
dicated all Uniform Commercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text.
3 U.C.C. § 6-102(3) states:
The enterprises subject to this Article are those whose principal business is the
sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture what they sell.
Unlike most earlier bulk sales laws, Article 6 specifically subjects manufacturers to its
provisions. The businesses covered do not include those which deal primarily in services
rather than the sale of merchandise. U.C.C. § 6-102, Comment 2.
4 U.C.C. § 6-102(1) states:
A "bulk transfer" is any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or
other inventory (Section 9-109) of an enterprise subject to this Article.
Whether or not a transfer is in fact a "bulk transfer" has been the subject of much
litigation under the pre-Code bulk sales acts. See Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses
Included, 1954 Wash. L.Q. 146. The draftsmen have selected the phrase "major part"
in defining the amount of materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory of an
enterprise subject to Article 6 which must be transferred to constitute a bulk transfer.
The phrase "major part" appeared in four pre-Code bulk sales laws: Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. fit. 42, ch. 734, § 42-101 (repealed 1961) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 121%, § 78 (Smith-
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coverage under the Article,8
 the Code provides for the prevention of com-
mercial fraud by requiring that notice° of the proposed bulk transfer be given
to all creditors of the bulk transferor.' This comment will examine the rights
and remedies of a transferor's aggrieved creditors when there has been non-
Hurd 1960) (repealed 1961) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-16-2 (repealed 1962) ; S.C.
Code Ann. § 11-201 (repealed 1968). The phrase has been construed on only one occa-
sion. In Zenith Radio Distrib. Corp. v. Mateer, 311 III. App. 263, 35 N.E.2d 815 (1941),
the appellate court of Illinois held that the sale of only 50% of a partnership did not
constitute the transfer of a "major part" of the business. The court, in construing the
bulk sales act strictly as a derogation of the common law, concentrated on a quantitative
rather than a qualitative approach.
These disparate approaches may be illustrated in the following manner. Assume a
jeweler has an inventory of fifty diamonds, ten of which have a greater combined value
than the other forty. A sale of these ten diamonds does not constitute a transfer of a
major part of the inventory if viewed from a quantitative approach. A "quantity" of
twenty-six diamonds, regardless of their total value, must be sold to qualify as a major
part of inventory under the quantitative approach. However, a sale of the ten diamonds
which total over 50% of the value of the inventory would be a transfer of a major
part of the inventory if viewed from the qualitative approach. The emphasis here is on
the value of the assets transferred whereas the quantitative approach emphasizes the
number of assets transferred.
The Rhode Island pre-Code statute added the words "in value" to "major part,"
and thus stressed the qualitative rather than the quantitative approach. The qualitative
approach seems to be correct, particularly in light of U.C.C. § 1-102(1) which requires
a liberal construction to effect the underlying policies of the Act. See W. Willier & F.
Hart, Forms and Procedures under the Uniform Commercial Code 11 61.04[2] (1965).
Idaho, Iowa and Wisconsin have added the phrase "in value" after "major part" in
their version of § 6-102(1). The Iowa Code commentators stated that this addition was
made "for the purpose of clarification; it states explicitly what is believed to be im-
plicit in the Official Text. This does not appear to be a substantive change." Iowa Code
Ann. § 544.6102, Comment (1967 revision). The Permanent Editorial Board has stated in
regard to these additions that "the words 'in value' are redundant, especially . . in
view of the purpose of Article 6." W. Willier & F. Hart, Uniform Commercial Code
Reporter Digest 1-446. Because the very meaning of the word "redundant" is "excessive,"
adding nothing of substantial importance, the position taken by the Permanent Editorial
Board lends support to the proposition that a qualitative rather than a quantitative
approach should be followed.
Section 6-102(2) uses the word "substantial" in defining that part of the equipment
of a subject enterprise which must be transferred to constitute a bulk transfer. In earlier
bulk sales legislation the term "substantial" appeared only in Cal. Civ. Code § 3440.1
(West 1954). It has been construed to include a pledge of 6% of stock in trade. Mark-
well & Co. v. Lynch, 114 F.2d 373 (9th Cir, 1940). However, a transfer of equipment
is regulated by Article 6 only if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of inven-
tory. U.C.C. § 6-102 (2).
6 Under U.C.C. § 6-103, eight types of transfer are not subject to Article 6.
6 U.C.C. § 6-105 states:
[Amu bulk transfer subject to this Article except one made by auction
sale (Section 6-108) is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor unless
at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or pays for them,
whichever happens first, the transferee gives notice of the transfer in the man-
ner and to the persons hereafter provided (Section 6-107).
7 Advance notice to the seller's creditors of the impending sale is an important pro-
tection against commercial fraud. Having such notice, the creditors can investigate the
price and other circumstances of the sale before it occurs, and determine at that time
whether they should try to stop the sale or impound the prooceeds. U.C.C. § 6-101, Com-
ments 3, 4.
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compliances with Article 6 or when there has been compliance coupled with
a "preference." 9
I. CREDITORS WHO QUALIFY FOR PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 6
Article 6 is designed to prevent commercial fraud by giving creditors of
a bulk. transferor the right to treat a non-complying transfer as ineffective.
However, in some cases it may be difficult to determine who is a creditor of
the transferor and thus a member of the protected class. Article 6 defines
creditors as "those holding claims based on transactions or events occurring
before the bulk transfer. .. ." 1 ° This definition changes the law in jurisdictions
where unliquidated and contingent claims were considered insufficient to
bring the claimant within the class of parties protected by the bulk sales
laws.il One holding an unliquidated claim now clearly qualifies as a creditor
under the Code."
Although Article 6 has clearly defined the status of a person holding an
unliquidated claim, it has not so defined the status of a person holding a
contingent daim.ls In construing pre-Code bulk sales legislation, most courts
held that contingent claims did not fall within the scope of the statutory
protection." The Article 6 definition of creditor and the comments thereto
do not specifically refer to this type of claim. However, a comparison of the
definitions of creditor found in Article 1 15 and Article 6 16. indicates that there
s Non-compliance, as used in this comment, refers to any party's failure to fulfill
the duties imposed on him by U.C.C. §§ 6-104 to 6-108.
9 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1964) defines a preference:
A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent
debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months
before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
10 U.C.C. § 6-109(1).
11 For instances in which unliquidated claims were held to be insufficient, see, e.g.,
Griffin v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 65 N.D. 379, 259 N.W. 89 (1934) ; Electrical Prods.
Corp. v. Ziegler, 157 Ore. 267, 71 P.2d 583 (1937).
For instances in which contingent claims were held to be insufficient see, e.g., Trust
Co. of Chicago v. Farguson, 340 111. App. 344, 92 N.E.2d 211 (1950).
12 U.C.C. § 6-109, Comment 1.
13 A contingent claim ordinarily implies a liability which may or may not occur
depending on some future event. For example, an indorser's liability on a negotiable in-
strument is contingent. The indorser is not liable on the instrument unless and until there
has been a dishonor. See U.C.C. § 3-414(1).
14 See, e.g., Apex Leasing Co. v. Litke, 173 App. Div. 323, 159 N.Y.S. 707 (App. T.
1916). The Dike court, like most courts speaking of the bulk sales acts, stated that this
legislation was in derogation of the common law and for that reason must be construed
strictly. Id. at 326, 159 N.Y.S. at 709. 3 S. Williston, Sales § 643(a) (rev ed. 1948).
15 U.C.C. § 1-201(12) states:
"Creditor" includes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor and
any representative of creditors, including an assignee for the benefit of, creditors,
a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity and an executor or administrator
of an insolvent debtor's or assignor's estate.
16 U.C.C. § 6-109(1) states:
The creditors of the transferor mentioned in this Article are those holding
claims based on transactions or events occurring before the bulk transfer . . .
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are two important additions in the Article 6 definition which make it reason-
able to conclude that contingent claimants are protected. These additions are:
a) a reference to time—those holding claims based on transactions or events
occurring before the bulk transfer; and b) an elaboration of the Article 1
use of the term "general" creditor.' 7 A general creditor has been defined as
one to whom a debt is due from another person called the debtor. 18 When a
claimant is a general creditor a relationship exists with a debtor which is
based on an obligation extending from the debtor to the creditor. Article 6
requires only that there be some relationship based on some event or trans-
action occurring before the bulk transfer. Article 6 does not require that the
claim be the foundation for a present obligation on the part of the transferor.
A party will be within the protected class if his claim meets the definitional
requirement necessary to establish some relationship with the transferor (his
debtor). A contingent liability, such as an indorser's contract, establishes
some relationship between the indorser and subsequent holders but there is
no obligation until dishonor occurs. The indorser's contract seems to meet
the Article 6 requirement that there be a claim based on some event occurring
before the bulk transfer.
Some significance must be given to the language which has been added
by Article 6 to the Article 1 definition of creditor." A meaning must be
attributed to the term as defined in Article 6, which meaning would not be
within the Article I definition. A construction which holds contingent claims
within the scope of Article 6 would give such meaning to the expanded defini-
tion of general creditor. Furthermore, such construction is consistent with
the definition in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 2° with some pre-
Code bulk sales decisions,21 and with the expressed intent of one of the Code's
draf tsmen. 22
17 Article I contains the only general definition of creditor. See note 15 supra. The
Code's purpose in defining a term in Article 1 is to provide a standard meaning for the
term for use throughout all ten Articles. This meaning applies unless some other definition
is given for a particular section or Article. Because the definition is intended for gen-
eral use throughout the Code, and because the only other definition of creditor is found
in Article 6, a new meaning must be sought for a proper application of the term as de-
fined in that Article.
19 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City Ry., 107 F. 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1901).
19 If the draftsmen intended to change the meaning of creditor in Article 6 only
by adding a time element to the Article 1 definition, a reasonable Article 6 definition
of creditor would read: The creditors of the transferor mentioned in this Article are
creditors who become such before the bulk transfer. This definition would delete the
6-109(1) addition of "claims based on transactions or events." Such deletion would
require reference to Article 1 for the complete meaning of creditor. The only change
made by § 6-109(1) would then be an addition of a time element. However, the drafts-
men did add this language, and rules of statutory construction require that the new
phraseology be given substantive meaning.
20 Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 1 states in pertinent part:
"Creditor" is a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured,
liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent.
21 Hanna v. Hurley, 162 Mich. 601, 127 NM. 710 (1910). In this case a con-
tingent creditor was permitted to attack a non-complying bulk transfer.
22 One of the original Code draftsmen has made clear the general intent to include
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The Code specifically states that the "Act shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."23 Although the
underlying policy of Article 6 is stated to be the prevention of commercial
fraud,24 the inclusion of unliquidated and non-commercial claims 25 indicates
a broader purpose, that an owner of a subject enterprise should not transfer
his business in bulk without first assuring payment, at least in part, for all
of his creditors 2a In order to effectuate this policy of expanded protection
the term "creditor" must be liberally construed so that the contingent claimant
is also able to assert a claim under Article 6. 27
contingent claimants in the Article 6 definition of creditor. In an appearance before the
New York Law Revision Commission, Professor Bunn stated that "the definition of
creditors does include contingent claims, etc.—that was deliberate, I think, because no
one could quite see any reason for excluding the person who was hit by the company's
truck any more than the person who had sold goods on credit to the [transferor] before
the transfer." 1 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 655 (1954). It would seem that this interpretation permits any
involuntary creditor, such as the accident victim, to be included in the Code definition.
W. Willier & F. Hart, supra note 4, 11 61.05; Billig, Article 6—Order Out of Chaos; A
Bulk Transfers Article Emerges, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 312, 330. A holding that involuntary
creditors are within the class of persons protected by bulk sales legislation would be
a significant departure from pre-Code law in some jurisdictions where it had been held
that a tort claimant was not protected by the bulk sales law if the claim was not re-
duced to judgment prior to the transfer. See, e.g., Hart v. Evans, 330 III. App. 385, 71
N.E.2d 596 (1947). However, this is not a general reversal of existing law. A significant
number of courts have held unliquidated tort claimants (whose claims are contingent) to
be,within the bulk sales law meaning of creditor. See, e.g., Malaquias v. Novo, 59 Cal.
App. 2d 225, 138 P.2d 729 (1943). See also Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 1211, 1229-32 (1962).
23 U.C.C. § 1-102 (1) ,
24 U.C.C. § 6-101, Comment 4.
28 As used here, the term non-commercial claim refers to any claim held by a
creditor which is not for merchandise furnished to the vendor in conducting the business
which was sold and which is not based on an extension of credit to the business trans-
ferred. See, e.g., Malaquias v. Novo, 59 Cal. App..2t1 225, 138 -P.2d 729 (1943). See also
Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 1211, 1232-36 (1962). -
2b The provisions of Article 6, except where optional § 6-106 has been enacted, are
not concerned with a pro rata distribution of the new consideration paid by the trans-
feree. The transferor is at liberty to.prefer one creditor over another unless the state has
some other statutory prohibition against preferential treatment of creditors.
The Code seeks to assure protection of creditOrs not by directing payments to them
• (except where optional § 6-106 has been enacted) but by requiring notice. it is then
up to the creditor to act to protect himself,
27 It has previously been noted that involuntary creditors may be included within
the Article 6 definition. See note 22 supra. The original bulk sales laws centered around
the, protection of the merchant creditor of the transferor. Such a creditor was one who
extended credit in reliance on the debtor's assets. Comparing the merchant creditor with
the involuntary creditor, it is apparent that the primary protection must still be for the
merchant creditor, the party most frequently affected by the bulk transfer. A , surety,
a contingent creditor, falls within the voluntary merchant creditor classification. Such a
person is likely to have entered the suretyship transaction on the supposition that if he
subsequently became liable on the debt of the bulk transferor, he would have recourse
against the transferor's assets. Clearly this reliance on a merchant's assets as a source
from which a debt may be satisfied is the type of reliance which the Code seeks to pro-
mote by protection of a fund to satisfy the loss which flowed therefrom.
285
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
IL SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ESTABLISHED BY NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH ARTICLE 6
A. Where Optional Section 6-106 Has Not Been Enacted
Procedures and substantive rights varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
under the pre-Code bulk sales laws. However, these laws generally fit one of
two principal patterns, depending on the rights and duties conferred. These
patterns have been termed the "New York form" and the "Pennsylvania
form."28
 Basically these forms were the same: a sale of stock or merchandise
out of the ordinary course of business was void as to the creditors of the
seller unless the parties (1) prepared a detailed inventory of the goods to be
transferred, (2) prepared a verified list of the seller's creditors and (3)
notified the listed creditors of the price and terms of the impending sale. 2"
If there is compliance with the bulk sales law, the two forms are distinguished
by their positions regarding control over the proceeds of the sale." Under
the "New York form" there was no control over the transferee's disposition
of the proceeds. The draftsmen of the "Pennsylvania form" apparently
decided that some control over disposition of the proceeds was an essential
part of an effective bulk sales law. They supplemented the "New York form"
by imposing an affirmative duty on the transferee to apply the purchase
money to the bona fide claims of creditors appearing on the verified list. 3 '
Both forms of legislation are mirrored in Article 6. Sections 6-104 and 6-105,
the "New York form," make a non-complying transfer "ineffective" against
any creditor of the transferor. The transferee is treated as a receiver of these
assets and is liable for their value if he converts them. The optional section
6-106, the "Pennsylvania form," makes a transferee personally liable to cer-
tain creditors (to the extent of new consideration) if he fails to apply the
proceeds properly.
Where section 6-106 has not been enacted, sections 6-104 and 6-105
establish a transferee's liability for non-compliance by providing that a
non-complying transfer shall be "ineffective against any creditor of the trans-
feror."32 Earlier bulk sales laws stated that a non-complying transfer would
"be void"" or "shall be fraudulent and void"" or "shall be presumed to be
28 Weintraub and Levin, Bulk Sales Law and Adequate Protection of Creditors,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 420 (1951). The New York form was adopted in thirty-eight
states, Hawaii, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id. at 420, n.7. The Pennsyl-
vania form was adopted in ten states. Id. at 420, n.IO.
22 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 44 (repealed 1964). Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69,
§§ 521-23 (repealed 1953).
30 Article 6 does not define the term "proceeds." However, the word is used in the
title to optional § 6-106 and clearly means new consideration which, by reason of the
transfer, becomes payable by the transferee to the transferor. See U.C.C. § 6-106, Com-
ment 1.
81 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 523 (repealed 1953).
If the purchaser for any reason doubted the completeness of the list or could not
determine the proper priority of claims, or for any other reason was unable to make
a proper distribution, he could pay the proceeds into the court of the county in which
the seller's business was located.
32 U.C.C. i§ 6-104(1), 6-105.
33 See, e.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 27, § 1 (repealed 1966).
34 See, e.g., Mont, Rev. Code Ann. tit. 18, ch. 2, § 202 (repealed 1965).
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fraudulent and void."35
 A variety of constructions have been given these
phrases. 36
 The Code draftsmen sought to avoid variation in construction by
introducing a new word of art, "ineffective." 37
In order to understand fully the meaning of "ineffective" it is essential
to appreciate the proper distinction between void and voidable. "Ineffective"
does not mean void as non-complying transfers were held to be under some
pre-Code bulk sales laws.38
 "Ineffective" does mean voidable at the instance
of a creditor of the transferor. A bulk transferee may transfer the property
free of title defect to "a purchaser for value in good faith and without . .
notice."39
 The power to transfer property free of title defect is a traditional
characteristic of voidable title. Were an executory contract void for non-
compliance, the seller would not be bound to proceed with the transfer, nor
could the buyer obtain damages. If the transfer were void, creditors of the
transferee could gain no interest in the assets. In Macy v. Oswald," the only
Code case considering whether non-compliance would permit a contracting
party to avoid an executed contract, the agreement was held enforceable
between the parties.
The power to transfer title free of defect, authority such as the Macy
decision and the transferor's creditor's right to disregard the transfer and to
levy on the goods,'" compel the conclusion that "ineffective" means voidable.
Furthermore, Comment 2 to section 6-104 makes clear the Code position that
only creditors of the transferor, as defined in section 6-109(1), may take
advantage of any non-compliance.
The aggrieved creditor of the transferor has the right to treat the non-
complying transfer as ineffective and therefore as voidable. It remains to be
considered how this right may be exercised and to what extent it will provide
satisfaction of a claim.
Article 6 does not provide any specific means to enforce the substantive
rights established when there has been a non-complying transfer. This absence
of specific remedial provisions may cause confusion concerning the meaning
35 See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann. tit. 20, § 10 (repealed 1967).
' 16 Johnston Bros. Co. v. Washburn, 12 Ala. App. 311, 77 So. 461 (1917). (Violation
of bulk sales law creates a rebuttable presumption of fraud.) Mach v. Baum, 98 Misc.
607, 163 N.Y.S. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1917). (Sale in violation of bulk sales law is ipso facto
null and void.)
37 This term appears only in §§ 6-104, 6-105.
38 See note 35 supra, and accompanying text.
39 U.C.C. § 6-110(2).
4° 198 Pa. Super. 436 (1962). The case concerned an executed contract for the
sale of a service station. The controversy arose when the buyer attempted to open
judgment on a note that he had given the seller as consideration for the transfer and on
which a judgment had been entered. Non-compliance was not a sufficient ground to
have the judgment set aside. The case is correct on its merits, but may have gone too
far in dicta which stated that compliance with the bulk sales law must be a condition
precedent in the sales agreement for a buyer to be able to avoid the transfer. Between
the parties, under Article 6, the contract would be enforceable. However, if the contract
is still executory and the seller refuses to supply the necessary list of creditors, he would
be disregarding a statutory obligation and thus acting in bad faith. Such bad faith is
a violation of the duty to perform all contracts in good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203. In
such a case, the buyer should be able to avoid the contract.
44 See U.C.C. § 6-104, Comment 2.
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of the rights conferred, particularly regarding the extent to which these rights
may be exercised to satisfy a claim." The Code states that a creditor may
levy on the goods, but does not say that this action must be for the benefit
of all creditors. It appears that a creditor who moves fast and attaches first
will be able to obtain full satisfaction of his claim, at least up to the value of
the assets transferred, while the slower creditor may receive little or nothing. 43
This construction follows the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which
granted an individual creditor the right to set aside a conveyance to the
extent necessary to satisfy his claim."
To date, no Code cases have arisen examining only the question of the
extent of recovery that may be had by the first of several creditors to attack
a non-complying transfer. However, in Bomanzi of Lexington, Inc. v. Tafel .°
the Kentucky Court of Appeals did consider the extent of liability of a bulk
42
 Where pre-Code bulk sales laws did not prOvide for remedial action, the courts
found no difficulty in resorting to statutes which provided for general equitable relief.
See, e.g., Settegast v. Second Nat'l Bank, 126 Tex. .330, 87 S.W.2d 1070 (1935). Com-
ment 2 to U.C.C. § 6-104 implies that equity jurisdiction for the appointment of a
receiver should be continued, or established if not previously existing in the jurisdiction.
This Comment states that a creditor may disregard the transfer and levy on the goods
as still belonging to the transferor, "or a receiver representing them can take by what-
ever procedure the local law provides." (Emphasis added.) This Comment has been the
basis for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of property allegedly transferred
in violation of Article 6. Belber v. H.S.F., Inc., 26 Pa. D. C.2d 796 (Montgomery
County Ct. 1960). In so deciding the court dismissed preliminary objections which con-
tended that the plaintiff-creditor had an adequate remedy at law which would prevent
the use of a court's equity powers.
43
 Lazar v. Towne House Restaurant Corp., 5 App. Div. 2d 794, 171 N.Y.S.2d 334
(Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd 6 N.Y.2d 923, 161 N.E.2d 211 (1959). In an action to set aside
a conveyance as fraudulent, the trial court granted judgment to the creditor as an
individual but not as a representative of the entire class.
In an action for conversion where a bulk transferee had disposed of the goods, and
where one creditor sued but other creditors were not made party to the action, it was
held that the diligent creditor could have full recovery so long as the debt did not
exceed the fair market value of the stock of merchandise transferred. Peter's Branch
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Gunn, 121 Miss. 679, 83 So. 742 (1920).
44 Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 9(a) states:
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such credi-
tor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser
for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of purchase,
or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent neces-
sary to satisfy his claim. • .
A matured claim, as used in § 9(a), is one which entitles the claimant to a present
recovery.
Section 10 of the same Act states:
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor
whose claim has not matured he may proceed in a court of competent juris-
diction against any person against whom he could have proceeded had his claim
matured, and the court may, •
(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property,
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property,
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or
(d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require.
As used in this section, a claim which is not matured is contingent.
45 415 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).
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transferee where there has been non-compliance with Article 6. The case also
raised the question of the extent of recovery that may be had by a single
attacking creditor. The plaintiff was a creditor and shareholder in the trans-
feror-corporation. The transferor was heavily indebted to its shareholders
as well as to other creditors. One of its major non-shareholder creditors
offered to invest a substantial sum of money in a new corporation in exchange
for a transfer of all the indebted corporation's assets. The transferee was
to assume all debts of the transferor except those owed to shareholders. All
shareholders except the plaintiff surrendered their debts and the transfer was
made. Plaintiff protested and brought suit alleging, inter alia, that a bulk
sale had been made without compliance with Article 6. 4° The court did not
find it necessary to consider the effect of non-compliance, but based its decision
on one of the plaintiff's other counts, a preferential transfer in contemplation
of insolvency. 47
 Although Kentucky has enacted Article 6, including optional
section 6-106, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment against
the transferee for the full amount of the plaintiff's claim. Relying on cases
decided under an earlier bulk sales act, the court held that the buyer was a
receiver and had only to make a proper accounting. The plaintiff's recovery
was limited to the pro rata share which she would have received had the
transferor been liquidated and all creditors who did not waive their debts
been satisfied according to any priorities." The decision appears patently
erroneous because, under sections 6-104 and 6-105, the plaintiff did have a
right to treat the transfer as ineffective and to have her entire claim satisfied."
The Code has adopted the questionable policy of preferring the creditor who
is quick to assert his rights.50 The application of this policy will cause inequi-
46 Id. at 629.
47 Such a transfer is a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378.060(1963), which states:
Any sale, mortgage or assignment made by a debtor and any judgment suf-
fered by a defendant, or any act or device done or resorted to by a debtor,
in contemplation of insolvency and with the design to prefer one or more credi-
tors to the exclusion, in whole or in part, of others, shall operate as an assign-
ment and transfer of all the property of the debtor, and shall inure to the
benefit of all his creditors, . • . in proportion to the amount of their respective
demands including those which are future and contingent. . . .
48 415 S.W.2d at 631.
49 The statute on which the Bomanaf court relied, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378.060
(1963), supra note 47, presents a conflict with U.C.C. §§ 6-104 and 6-105 insofar as their
respective remedial provisions are concerned. If a seller transfers his property to a creditor
in satisfaction of an antecedent debt and the transfer is in contemplation of insolvency
and with the design to prefer the transferee creditor over other creditors, there is a
violation of § 378.060. There may also be non-compliance with Article 6. Under § 378.060,
the transfer inures to the benefit of all creditors of the seller. However, if one creditor
levies on the property before the others, Article 6 gives him full recovery. Section 378.060
and U.C.C. §§ 6-104 and 6-105 are thus in conflict in the given situation. It is sub-
mitted that U.C.C. § 10-103 repeals that part of § 378.060 which provides that the trans-
fer inures to the benefit of all creditors of the transferor. This conflict exists only if
there is non-compliance with Article 6. The Code does not provide any new substantive
rights when there has been compliance. The best resolution of the conflict seems to be
the application of § 378.060 where there has been compliance, but that statute should
not be applied where Article 6 has not been complied with.
50 The same policy was adopted in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in
1918. See §§ 9(a) and 10 of the Act at note 44 supra.
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table results and thus it is not unlikely that courts will avoid a proper interpre-
tation of the remedial provisions of Article 6 or will not apply those provisions
at all.
B. Where Optional Section 6-106 Has Been Enacted
Where the New York form, sections 6-104 and 6-105, has been supple-
mented by the enactment of optional section 6-106, the so-called Pennsylvania
form, a new duty and personal liability are placed on the transferee. 51 The
liability, however, is not so broad as that imposed by the original Pennsyl-
vania statute upon which it is based. 52 That statute made a vendee personally
liable for non-compliance to the extent of the fair value of all property bought
or sold." The Code imposes personal liability only up to the amount of the
new consideration, regardless of what relationship this consideration bears to
the fair value of the property transferred." The Pennsylvania form rendered
the vendee liable to all of the vendor's creditors. Article 6 strictly limits
liability to those creditors either appearing on the list of creditors prepared
pursuant to section 6-104 or responding to notice given pursuant to section
6-107. 55
 Section 6-106(1) does state that the liability of the transferee runs
to all holders of such debts, but the phrase such debts refers only to debts
owed creditors appearing on the creditor list or responding to notice." Any
There is some authority for the position that the "New York form" does not favor
the diligent creditor, but rather is a legislative attempt to put all creditors on an equal
footing. Middle Tenn. Mills v. Rocky River Coal & Lumber Co., 177 Tenn. 31, 145
S.W.2d 787 (1940). In this case, the court treated the transferred assets as a trust fund
for the benefit of all creditors. Though the result may 'seem desirable, it does not fol-
low the majority rule under the New York form.
51 The new duty imposed on the transferee by optional § 6-106 concerns the dis-
position of the proceeds of the sale. Where this section has been enacted it is the duty
of the transferee to assure that the new consideration is applied to pay the debts of
the transferor which are either shown on the list furnished by the transferor or are filed
in writing pursuant to the notice required by § 6-107. This 'duty may be fulfilled by
direct payment to the transferor's creditors or, if optional subsection (4) has been en-
acted, by paying the consideration into the court of the county where the transferor
has his principal place of business. If the transferee pays the proceeds into the court,
he must do so within ten days of taking possession of the goods and he must notify
those to whom his duty runs that this action has been taken.
It has been stated that under the New York form a transferee does not have per-
sonal liability, but that be is a mere receiver. The statement is correct but incomplete.
The non-complying transferee is personally liable for conversion under the New York
form if he disposes of the subject matter of the transfer. Settegast v. Second Nat'l
Bank, 126 Tex. 330, 87 S.W.2d 1070 (1935).
52 See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 523 (repealed 1953).
52 Wolfe v. Millers Garage, Inc., 89 Pa. D. & C. 199 (Cumberland County Ct. 1954).
51 If the transfer is not for a fair consideration it will be subject to attack as fraudu-
lent under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
55 U.C.C. § 6-106, Comment 3 states in part:
ENlotice that the transferee's obligation runs, not to all possible creditors of
the transferor who may appear at any time in the future, but only to existing
creditors whom the transferee has a chance to identify in one of the ways pro-
vided in subsection (1).
The reference to creditors who may be identified under subsection (1) is to creditors
who appear on the list furnished pursuant to § 6-104 or who file in writing in the place
stated in the notice. See U.C.C. § 6-104(1).
56 W. Wilier & F. Hart, supra note 4, 61.06[3].
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single creditor can enforce this liability, but unlike the recovery available
under sections 6-104 and 6-105, any action under section 6-106 must be for
the benefit of all the listed or responding creditors and may not be for the
individual's benefit.57 The personal liability imposed by section 6-106 is only
operative where there has been at least partial compliance with sections 6-104
and 6-107.58 When there is compliance" with these sections, the transfer will
be effective° against all creditors and liability will be limited to that imposed
by section 6-106. The maximum liability is the amount of new consideration
paid by the transferee. However, under section 6-109(2), the transferee is
entitled to credit for sums paid in good faith to particular creditors of the
transferor. The good faith requirement is an honest belief, at the time such
payments were made, that they were properly payable. The total of such
payments is deducted from the new consideration to determine the final
amount of personal liability.
The Code does not state whether all creditors must be joined when a
single creditor brings an action under section 6-106. It has been suggested
that joining all similarly situated creditors should not be required, and that a
judgment should be drawn broad enough to allow all creditors to recover.°'
The same commentators have suggested that compulsory joinder would result
in extreme difficulty. It is submitted that compulsory joinder would not
result in extreme difficulty, particularly where only liquidated claims are
concernecl.62 The attacking creditor will, by definition,°3 have access to the
57 The last sentence of § 6-106(1) states, in effect:
[The] duty of the transferee [to pay the debts of the transferor] runs to all
[creditors shown on the list furnished by the transferor who respond to notice
sent pursuant to section 6-107], and [this duty] may be enforced by any [of
said creditors] for the benefit of all. (Emphasis added.)
58 The duty to distribute new consideration properly runs only to creditors listed
under § 6-104 or responding to notice given pursuant to § 6-107. See notes 55 and 57
supra. Failure to observe this duty results in personal liability. However, there can be
no such liability if no list is drawn up or no notice is published, because there would be
no creditors with standing to enforce the duty.
The class of creditors protected under § 6-106(1) should be the same as that class
protected under §§ 6-104 and 6-105 because the list prepared pursuant to § 6-104 is
the basis for § 6-106(1) liability. For this reason, it may be expected that a court will
hold the failure to prepare such list to he a breach of a duty imposed by § 6-106(1).
The basis for such a decision would be that one cannot avoid a personal liability through
his own refusal to comply with the statute. In such a case, it would be logical to impose
personal liability to all creditors up to the amount of new consideration.
59 The notice outlined in § 6-107 must be given ten days before the transferee
pays for the goods or takes possession of them, whichever happens first. See U.C.C.
§ 6-105. This interval is essential for the notice to be valid and for the transfer to be
effective.
99 U.C.C. § 6-106 does not state that a transfer is effective if all other sections
are complied with but the new consideration is misapplied. The validity of the sale is
clear because of the common law right to alienate property. If there is no clear derogation
of this right, there is no basis for denying the effectiveness of its exercise. See W. Willier
& F. Hart, supra note 4, 11 61.0613].
Cl Id,
92 A liquidated claim is one in which the total liability has been fixed by agree-
ment, by operation of law or may be ascertained by application of arithmetic principles.
Such claim is not a product of admitted liability, but only of its extent if liability does
in fact exist. This type of claim usually arises ex contractu and not ex delicto.
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names and addresses of all creditors within the protected class. It would be
very easy to notify and compel joinder of these parties, forcing them to prove
their claims." Since in any event all attacking creditors in this class must
act within six months," it is submitted that in actions under section 6-106
courts should require the joinder of all creditors. The pro rata distribution
required by section 6-106(3) could then be effectuated more quickIy.66
III. RIGHTS OF THE CREDITOR OMITTED FROM THE SECTION 6-104 LIST
If the transferee attempts to comply with Article 6 but the transferor
gives him an incomplete or an erroneous list of creditors, the transfer is
ef ective unless it can be shown that the transferee had knowledge of the
error or omission. 67
 This protection given the transferee is based on early
constitutional decisions restricting the application of bulk sales laws. The
general view was that a purchase of a stock of goods was an act innocent in
itself and that for this reason the fraud of the vendor could not reasonably
detract from the title transferred to an innocent buyer. To permit less than
full title to pass would be an unreasonable exercise of police power." Thus,
a creditor who has been omitted from the list and who, for constitutional
reasons, may not treat the transfer as ineffective, is restricted to an action
against the transferor. The vendor, by omission of one of his creditors from
the verified list, renders himself liable to criminal prosecution for false
swearing.69
There are two cases in which the transferee may be liable both for the
assets transferred and for the new consideration. The first case will occur
when there is non-compliance with section 6-105 because the notice required
by section 6-107 was not sent ten days before the transferee took possession
or paid for the goods. Therefore, the transfer will be ineffective, and section
6-106 liability is incurred if the new consideration is not properly distributed.
In the second case, if the transferee knows of an inaccuracy (e.g., an attempt
to defraud one creditor) in the list prepared pursuant to section 6-104, the
transfer is rendered ineffective by section 6-104(3), and again section 6-106
63 The attacking creditor either will be listed on the § 6-104 list of creditors or will
have responded to notice sent pursuant to 6-107. These groups of creditors are the only
ones who can benefit from an action under § 6-106. See note 58 supra. The names and
addresses of these creditors must be kept available to all creditors for six months. U.C.C.
§ 6-104(1)(c).
64 Such procedure would enable a court to determine the transferee's total liability
in one action. Furthermore, the statute speaks in terms of one creditor "enforcing" the
transferee's duty for the benefit of all creditors. Because there is no common basis for the
claims against the transferor, it is difficult to understand how one creditor can determine
what liability can be enforced without joining all creditors.
06 See U.C.C. § 6-111.
66 If disputed or contingent claims are asserted it may be necessary to form a decree
directing that the total amount of these claims be held in escrow until liability is deter-
mined. In the event that such claims are large enough to deny those holding liquidated
claims full recovery, a decree may be drawn to permit access to the assets after the post-
ing of bond up to the total of the disputed contingent claims.
67 U.C.C. § 6-104(3). The knowledge spoken of in this section is actual knowledge
• and does not include notice or reason to know. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
68 See, e.g., Coach v. Gage, 70 Ore. 182, 138 P. 847 (1914).
89 See U.C.C. § 6-104, Comment 3.
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liability is incurred if the new consideration is not properly distributed. In
the latter case the Code penalizes heavily what may amount to actual fraud,
but the former case imposes double liability because of a simple timing error
on the part of the transferee. 7° The Code does not refer to these possibilities
of double liability and the question never appears to have arisen under either
Article 6 or earlier bulk sales laws. 71
 It is submitted that the Code should be
construed to avoid multiple liability in cases of good faith timing errors.
Where a good faith attempt has been made to comply with section 6-105, the
only liability should be for any misapplication of the new consideration.
However, in cases of actual fraud the courts may impose multiple liability.
Here, there is little reason to excuse the transferee. More importantly, the
imposition of multiple liability may have a preventive effect which will pro-
mote the Code policy of protecting the transferor's creditors. In any event,
multiple liability should be imposed only when necessary to satisfy the just
claims of the creditor of the transferor. Such liability should not be used for
punitive reasons to give the protected creditors more than their actual damage.
IV. INTERESTS SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF A TRANSFEROR'S CREDITOR
A. Creditors of the Transferee
A recent case, Automatic Canteen Co. v. Wharton," has considered what
is essentially the problem of priority of rights in transferred property when
creditors of the transferee levy before creditors of the transferor. In this case
an insolvent subsidiary corporation attempted to dissolve and become a de-
partment within its parent. The transaction involved a bulk transfer, but
there was no compliance with the statute. 73 The parent corporation was sub-
70 The timing error may stem from poor draftsmanship. U.C.C. § 6-105 requires that
notice be given at least ten days before the transferor takes possession of the goods or
pays for them. The date by which notice must be sent therefore is calculated from the date
of payment or transfer of possession, whichever occurs first. Although Comment 1 to
§ 6-105 states that "Etlhis section is the heart of the Article," nowhere does this important
section define what constitutes payment, nor do there appear to be any clear guidelines.
Whether earnest money, the payment of a part of the price of goods sold for the purpose
of binding the contract, or part payment will cause the statute to come into play is un-
clear. Two states, Connecticut and Wisconsin, have adopted non-uniform sections deal-
ing with this problem. The Connecticut statute requires a deposit of more than ten
percent of the purchase price, and Wisconsin requires "the major part of the purchase
price" to be paid before the notice section is to apply. Also, in Connecticut an escrow
arrangement will not require notice. The Permanent Editorial Board has stated that these
variations are unnecessary, but the Board has not acted to resolve the unanswered ques-
tion. Because it may be commercially reasonable to make a deposit prior to obtaining a
list of creditors, it is submitted that a proper construction of payment would not include
earnest money. It is suggested that since § 6-105 appears to speak in terms of a transfer
of possession, the contemplated meaning of payment is final payment, or at least some
substantial transfer of more than earnest money where the price is to be paid over a
period of time. See R. Duesenberg & L. King, Sales and Bulk Transfers Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code § 15.04(3) (1966).
71 It is not surprising that the question of double liability was never considered
under pre-Code law. No earlier bulk sales act combined the New York form with the
Pennsylvania form of liability.
72 358 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1966).
73 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 33 -201 (repealed 1964). The statute has been held to treat a non-
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sequently put into involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. In an action by a creditor of the transferor to impress a con-
structive trust on the proceeds from the sale of the transferor assets, it was
held that he had a right to the proceeds superior to that of the transferee's
trustee. The court concluded that the insolvent transferee corporation's
directors held the assets in trust for the transferor's creditors as a class.
Because the bankrupt transferee held the assets in constructive trust for the
creditors of the transferor, and because the trustee had no greater right to
the assets than did the bankrupt or any creditor of the bankrupt, the trans-
feree's trustee also held the assets and their proceeds in trust for the creditors
of the transferor. However, the decision to create a constructive trust was
based primarily on policy grounds and not on a violation of the bulk sales
act, as the court explicitly rejected this theory of the transferor's creditor.'"
However, the court apparently conceded that had the transferor's creditors
acted before the trustee's lien arose (the date of bankruptcy) they could have
prevailed on a theory of non-compliance with the hulk sales act, as well as
on the constructive trust theory by which they did prevail. 75 In essence the
court held that the transfer was voidable but could not be avoided after the
trustee's lien arose." If no bankruptcy in fact occurs, and if the transferor's
creditor levies on the property prior to a levy by the transferee's creditor,
the transferor's creditor will have a superior right to the property. Conversely,
if the transferee's creditor acts first, his levy will establish a right to the
assets superior to that of the transferor's creditors. The theory is that the
transfer is voidable, and if the transferor's creditor acts first, the transfer is
voided to the extent of his claim. When the transferee's creditor subsequently
attempts to attach the assets, the transferee's rights are no longer existent
and nothing remains for his creditor to attach. Under Wharton, if the trans-
feree's creditor acts first, the transferee will still have rights in the goods and
these will inure to the benefit of the transferee's creditors. The transferee's
rights in the assets can be defeated by the transferor's creditors, but the
transferee's creditor's rights, once established by levy, cannot be so defeated.
Thus the creditors of the transferee have greater rights in the assets than
does the transferee himself. This is consistent with the Article 6 policy of
favoring the diligent creditor. The principle that first in time is first in right
reigns supreme.77
complying transfer as voidable at the instance of a seller's creditor. See, e.g., Rothchild v.
State, 200 Ind. 501, 505, 165 N.E. 60, 61 (1929).
74 358 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1966).
75 Id.
76
 This is the heart of the decision regarding priority of rights. Under § 70(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964), the trustee has the rights of actual and
hypothetical lien creditors of the bankrupt. When the court stated that the trustee could
not prevail if the transferor's creditors levied first, it was saying in effect that the trans-
feree's creditor's rights are subordinate to the transferor's creditors' rights when the latter
act first. The most diligent creditor may be satisfied to the exclusion of all others. Cf. In re
Dee's, Inc., 311 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1962).
77 Giving the transferor's creditors' rights to transferred property superior to the
rights of a transferee's creditors would comport with the Code's only explicit protection
of persons with a defective title to transferred assets. Under § 6-110(2) a purchaser for
value in good faith and without notice takes free of any defect in title arising from non-
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It is submitted that the emphasis on favoring the diligent creditor con-
flicts with another Code policy, and with the primary purpose of Article 6, the
prevention of commercial fraud. Without the fictional trust, the Wharton
court could not protect the transferor's creditors as Article 6 is designed to
do. A dishonest seller could transfer his assets to a friendly, insolvent buyer
who proceeds into bankruptcy. The seller then disappears leaving his creditors
unpaid. Perhaps this is the result which the Wharton court sought to prevent
when it created a constructive trust for the benefit of the transferor's creditors.
The decision gives an equitable result and attains the goals of Article 6 by
protecting the transferor's creditors. The same result could have been reached
in accord with the Code and without the use of the trust fiction. The transfer
being ineffective against the creditors of the transferor, it should also be
voidable against the lien creditors of the transferee. These creditors would
have no more rights in the assets than the transferee. The policy and logic
of the Code demand that a transferor's creditors have rights to transferred
assets superior to any right of an attacking creditor of the transferee. Further-
more, such rights can be conclusively established by the refusal to give the
transferee's creditors greater rights in the transferred assets than the Code
gives the transferee.
B. The Transferee's Trustee in Bankruptcy
In two instances the rights of a transferor's creditors may be in conflict
with and subordinate to the rights of a transferee's trustee in bankruptcy.
Section 67 (a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act renders null and void any judicial
lien against the bankrupt's property, whether obtained by attachment, judg-
ment or levy, if at the time the lien was created the transferee was insolvent
and if within four months of the creation of the lien a petition in bankruptcy
is filed.78 Thus if a transferor's creditor levies on transferred assets while
the transferee is insolvent and within four months of the levy a petition is
filed for or against the transferee, the levy of the transferor's creditor may be
avoided by the trustee. The third-party rights of the transferor's creditors do
not survive the bankruptcy. In the second instance of conflicting rights, if the
compliance. No creditor could qualify for the protection of § 6-110(2) because a creditor
who attaches does not gain an interest in an asset by a voluntary transaction, and he
thus cannot be a purchaser. See U.C.C. § 1-201(33) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Vera,
352 Mass. 11, 14-15, 223 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1967). The transferee's creditors cannot qualify
for the only explicitly protected class in Article 6, and no court should create a new
class of protected parties. Pre-Code authority standing for the proposition that an execu-
tion creditor is a bona fide purchaser for fair consideration should not now be fol-
lowed. See City of New York v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1943).
78 Bankruptcy Act § 67(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1) (1964) states:
Every lien against the property of a person obtained by attachment, judgment,
levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings within four months before
the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against such
person shall be deemed null and void (a) if at the time when such lien was ob-
tained such person was insolvent. . . .
The section refers to every lien, and not only to liens held by creditors of the bankrupt.
Therefore the liens which the transferor's creditors attempt to establish fall within the
scope of this section, and are void if all other conditions are met. The principle that first
in time is first in right is overridden by § 67 of the Bankruptcy Act. See In re Vanity
Fair Shoe Corp., 84 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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lien is created within one year of the filing of the petition, it is fraudulent
under section 67(4) (2) where the debtor is or will be thereby rendered
insolvent." In this situation the transfer can be avoided by the trustee under
section 70(e).80
Therefore, the substantive rights established by a non-complying transfer
do not survive the transferee's bankruptcy under the given circumstances and
Article 6 is of no avail to the transferor's creditors when there is a conflict
with the transferee's trustee in bankruptcy. 8'
V. SALES AT AUCTION
Section 6-108 brings auction sales within the scope of Article 6, but does
not impose any liability on the auctioneer 82
 unless he has actual knowledge"
that the transfer is in bulk. If the auctioneer has such knowledge and fails to
comply with the requirements of section 6-108, he is personally liable to the
70 Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1964) states:
Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one year
prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or
against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer
or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who
is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent. . . .
The term transfer used in § 67(d) (2) is defined in § 1(30) and includes an involun-
tary disposition of property. Therefore an attachment or Ievy against the transferor's
property is a transfer and falls within the scope of § 67(d) (2). There is no fair con-
sideration for an attachment by a transferor's creditor.
80 There seem to be few instances in which a preferential transfer would occur be-
cause such a transfer must he to or for the benefit of a creditor of the bankrupt. See
§ 60(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1964), quoted at note 9 supra.
The transferor's creditor is not a creditor of the bankrupt unless the bankrupt owed a
debt to him at the time of the transfer. See 3 W. Collier, Bankruptcy If 60.16 n.3 (14th
ed. 1968). Creditor, as used in § 60(a) (1), is defined in § 1(11) and includes anyone
who owes a debt, demand or claim provable in bankruptcy. Debts provable in bank-
ruptcy are defined in § 63. It does not appear that the claim of a transferor's creditor will
be within any of the approved list of debts found in § 63.
In at least one instance a transferor's creditor will have a claim provable in bank-
ruptcy. Where the transferee assumes the transferor's debts, the claims are provable in
bankruptcy. In re Johnson-Hart Co., 34 F.2d 183 (D. Minn. 1929). If the transferee
assumes the debts owed to all of the transferor's creditors, the transfer will be excluded
from the operation of Article 6. U.C.C. § 6-103(6), (7).
81 The decision in Wharton cannot be expected to provide relief from the general
rule that the transferor's creditor's rights do not survive the petition in bankruptcy. The
constructive trust, or trust fund theory, relied upon by the Wharton court has not been
followed by that or any other court since the decision was handed down.
82 U.C.C. § 6-108(3) defines an auctioneer as "ItThe person or persons other than
the transferor who direct, control or are responsible for the auction.. . ."
63 The requirement that the auctioneer have actual knowledge that the transfer is in
bulk places a heavy burden of proof on the attacking creditor. He must show that the
auctioneer knew both the facts and the law surrounding the bulk transfer. The language
of the statute requires that the auctioneer know the facts and the law so that he may
make a legal determination that a bulk transfer will take place. This decision must be
made at Ieast ten days before the auction so notice may be sent to creditors. The auc-
tioneer will either have to learn Article 6 and its application, or will simply ignore it
thereby never having the requisite knowledge to incur liability. Comment 2 to U.C.C.
§ 6-108 therefore is misleading in its assumption that in most cases the auctioneer will be
aware that a bulk sale is to take place.
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transferor's creditors as a class. The clear language of the section indicates
that the individual creditor cannot have recovery against the auctioneer, but
rather that a class action must be brought.84 The auctioneer's liability is
limited to the net proceeds of the auction. 85
VI. RIGHTS WHERE THERE HAS BEEN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 6
Article 6 nowhere requires the transferee to pay a fair consideration for
the merchandise he receives. Thus, without violating the Code a vendor may
sell his assets for an inadequate price and receive proceeds insufficient to pay
his creditors. Furthermore, where optional section 6-106 has not been enacted,
the seller may honestly dissipate the proceeds without heeding the claims of
existing creditors.
The Code provides a ten-day notice period prior to the bulk transferee's
paying of the proceeds or taking possession." The Article further provides for
the preservation of the list of creditors and property schedule for six months. 87
During this time the creditors may inspect the property list to determine
whether or not a fair consideration is being paid. When the consideration is
inadequateas the transfer will be a violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act if the vendor is or will thereby be rendered insolvent." The
84 It is submitted that the argument at pp. 291-92 supra, regarding joinder of all
creditors for an action under U.C.C. § 6-106, applies equally to an action brought under
U.C.C. § 6-108.
85 See U.C.C. § 6-108(4).
It is to be noted that this subsection assures good title to one who purchases at auc-
tion. Creditors of the transferor have no action against such purchasers, even if they
have knowledge that there has been non-compliance with Article 6, However, U.C.C.
§ 1-203 requires that all contracts be performed in good faith. It is at least arguable that
one who buys at auction with actual knowledge that Article 6 has not been complied
with is not acting in good faith. Because the Code is silent regarding the liability which
may follow transactions performed in bad faith, a court might infer that the breach of
the duty to act in good faith results in a defective title. The protection given by U.C.C.
§ 6-108(4) to purchasers at auction may then be given only to good faith purchasers,
those purchasing without knowledge of non-compliance. It is submitted that such a
construction would amount to the imposition of a liability which the Code draftsmen did
not intend, as is evident from their selection of the term purchaser rather than the phrase
good faith purchaser. However, the protection given under U.C.C. § 6-108(4) should not
be permitted to allow a sham transaction in which the purchaser buys at bargain prices
or with secreted funds of the transferor with the intent to transfer the assets back to
the transferor. Such a bad faith transaction should render the buyer's title voidable and
make him liable to the transferor's creditors for conversion if he disposes of the goods.
86 See U.C.C. § 6-105, quoted at note 6 supra.
87 See U.C.C. § 6-104(1)(c).
88 U.F.C.A. § 3 states:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation,
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satis-
fied, or
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a
present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as
compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained.
88 U.F.C.A. § 4 states:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or
will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard
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creditors may then act under Section 9 of the U.F.C.A. to avoid the transfer.
The creditor wishing to attack a transfer as fraudulent under the U.F.C.A.
should not await the end of the six-month statute of limitations found in
Section 6-111 of the Code. Although that section applies only to Article 6,
because the U.F.C.A. does not contain its own statute of limitations there is a
substantial likelihood that a court will hold that the creditor who waits longer
than six months to assert his claim has waived his rights or may be estopped
from asserting them.
A transfer for inadequate consideration which renders a debtor insolvent
will be fraudulent and voidable under Section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act."
If bankruptcy proceedings are instituted against the transferor, the transfer
may be avoided and the trustee will have available the machinery necessary
to assure a fair distribution of the proceeds among the various creditors
according to their priorities.
If a transfer is made to a creditor on account of an antecedent debt and
the transferor is insolvent at the time of the transfer, and a petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed for or against the transferor within four months of the transfer,
and the effect of the transfer is to enable the transferee creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of his class, the
transfer will constitute a preference under Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act and may be avoided by the trustee.'11 This result holds even where there
is compliance with Article 6 and the outstanding debt was greater than the
value of the assets transferred. Thus, the petition in bankruptcy is a remedy
available to the transferor's creditors where there has been compliance with
Article 6. A creditor should act quickly on receipt of the section 6-105 notice
because a proceeding under section 60(a) must be initiated within four months
of the alleged preference. The six-month statute of limitations in section 6-111
is of no avail when the action is brought under the Bankruptcy Act.° 2
Where optional section 6-106 has not been enacted and the seller is not
rendered insolvent or no bankruptcy proceedings are set in motion, it seems
that the creditor has no remedy except to seek the proceeds in the hands of
to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred with-
out a fair consideration.
tH) Bankruptcy Act § 70(e)'(1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1964) states:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a bank-
rupt under this title which, under any Federal or State law applicable thereto,
is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the
debtor, having a claim provable under this title, shall be null and void as against
the trustee of such debtor.
The trustee is given the rights which any actual creditor of the bankrupt may have
under state Iaw. If any creditor could attack the transfer as a violation of § 4 of the
U.F.C.A., the trustee could do likewise.
° 1 See note 9 supra.
02 It does not appear that a creditor will suffer substantially if he waits for the
expiration of the four-month period in hopes of satisfying his claim in full during the
remaining two months by showing some non-compliance. Such planning is ill-advised.
Other creditors, seeing what has happened, will file a petition in bankruptcy and the
levy will be voidable under § 67 of the Act. All the creditor will have achieved is a
delay in receiving his share of the assets. Furthermore, it is likely that during the delay
more debts will be incurred, thus reducing the percentage of recovery which the delay-
ing creditor will receive.
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the seller. There is no guarantee that these proceeds will not be dissipated
before the creditors act, nor is there any guarantee that the transferor will
still be in the jurisdiction."
CONCLUSION
The rights of a transferor's aggrieved creditors under Article 6 are
imperfectly defined. Where uncertainties exist, the Code should be construed
to provide rights and remedies which will best prevent commercial fraud. In
the following areas the Permanent Editorial Board should promulgate Code
amendments to clarify creditor's rights and to assure uniformity:
1. The Article 6 definition of creditor should be drawn with reference to
liquidated, unliquidated, absolute, fixed, contingent and involuntary claims.
2. Recognizing that in any event a creditor must act within six months
of a non-complying transfer, and recognizing the inequity which may result
when a single creditor is permitted full satisfaction of his claim, the Code
should be amended to require any attacking creditor to join all other creditors
so that each may receive some satisfaction from the available assets. The
adoption of this suggested amendment would achieve the equality that is now
available under the Bankruptcy Act, where all creditors share proportionately
in available assets.
3. The principle of first in time, first in right should be abandoned
where there is a conflict between creditors of the transferor and of the trans-
feree. All creditors of the transferor who act within six months of the non-
complying transfer should have a right to the assets superior to that of the
creditors of the transferee. This proposed amendment, combined with the
compulsory joinder which has been suggested, would assure the protection of
the transferor's creditors and would greatly aid in the elimination of the
commercial fraud which Article 6 is designed to prevent."
4. A definition of payment should be promulgated and adopted by all
states so that prospective transferees can accurately determine the date from
which the section 6-105 notice period must be measured. If notice is not sent
ten days before payment or transfer of possession the transfer will be ineffec-
tive. It would be manifestly unreasonable to impose the sanction of an
ineffective transfer on a transferee who was unable to determine accurately
the proper notice period because the draftsmen failed to define the term
payment.
5. Some positive duty of inquiry should be placed on auctioneers so
they will feel constrained to comply with Article 6.
93 As this discussion assumes compliance with Article 6, the transferor's creditors
will have been sent notice at least ten days before the transfer or payment of the price.
To avoid the possibility of dissipated proceeds or an absent debtor, upon receipt of the
proceeds a creditor should act immediately to obtain a lien on the proceeds.
94 Admittedly, the proposed change would permit fraud on the buyer's creditors.
The buyer pays for the goods, the seller absconds with the proceeds which he receives,
the seller's creditors will have a superior right to the assets, and the buyer's creditors are
defrauded. The best solution to this problem appears to be to require that notice be
sent to the buyer's creditors as well as the seller's. If the buyer's creditors recognize that
the transfer will render the buyer incapable of meeting his debts as they mature, these
creditors should be permitted to enjoin the transfer until their claims are satisfied.
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"Ineffective," the new word of art adopted by the draftsmen to describe
the voidability of non-complying transfers, is sufficiently clear to be uniformly
understood and construed.
All states should be vigorously encouraged to adopt optional section
6-106 to insure control over the distribution of the proceeds of a transfer.
Those states which have not enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act should do so in order that transfers which comply with the Code but
which render a seller insolvent may be get aside even if no bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are begun.
The tightness of the control suggested may cause complaint and delay,
but this control over the transferor's dealings with his assets is fully war-
ranted, for the transferor's first duty should be to those who have extended
credit based on these assets.
JOSEPH L. COOK
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